

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
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ALEXANDER L STEVAS.

No. 82-2154

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1983

MONTGOMERY MALL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Petitioner,

vs.

GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION,

Respondent,

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

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General Electric Credit Corporation.

Questions Presented.

1. Did the Bankruptcy Court have jurisdiction to enter a summary judgment of foreclosure in a pending adversary proceeding?
2. Did the Bankruptcy Court violate FRCP 56 in entering its summary judgment of foreclosure?
3. Are the issues in this case moot?

Designation of Corporate Relationships.

General Electric Credit Corporation, filing this brief in opposition to petition for certiorari as respondent in this proceeding, states that:

This is its original designation of corporate relationships.

The General Electric Company is the parent of General Electric Credit Corporation.

The Puritan Life Insurance Company and the Puritan Insurance Company, are subsidiaries of General Electric Credit Corporation. The General Electric Credit Corporation does not have an ownership interest in any other subsidiaries (except only wholly-owned subsidiaries).

The only affiliates and associates of General Electric Credit Corporation are the following:

Name	Jurisdiction of Incorporation	Percent Owned
General Electric Credit Corporation	New York	—
Acquisition Funding Corporation	Delaware	100.0%
Aircraft Services Corporation	Nevada	100.0
Creative Credit Services, Inc.	Delaware	100.0
Full Service Leasing Corporation	Delaware	100.0
GECC Escrow Services, Inc.	California	100.0
GECC Financial Corporation	Hawaii	100.0
— GECC Hawaii Leasing Corporation	Hawaii	100.0
General Electric Mortgage Capital Corporation	Delaware	100.0
— General Electric Mortgage Insurance Services, Inc.	North Carolina	100.0
— General Electric Equity Insurance Corporation	North Carolina	100.0
— General Electric Guaranty Insurance Corporation	North Carolina	100.0
— AMIC Title Insurance Company	North Carolina	100.0

— General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation of California	California	100.0
— General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation of North Carolina	North Carolina	100.0
— General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation	Ohio	99.6
— General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation of Florida	Florida	99.6
— General Electric Mortgage Securities Corporation	Delaware	100.0
GEVEST Corporation	Delaware	100.0
General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc.	Delaware	100.0
General Electric Credit Corporation of Delaware	Delaware	100.0
General Electric Credit Corporation of Georgia	Georgia	100.0
General Electric Credit Corporation of Puerto Rico	Puerto Rico	100.0
— General Electric Credit and Leasing Corporation of Puerto Rico	Puerto Rico	100.0
General Electric Credit Corporation of Tennessee	Tennessee	100.0
General Electric Credit International, N.V.	Netherlands	100.0
General Electric Credit and Leasing Corporation	Antilles	100.0
General Electric Mortgage Corporation of Delaware	Delaware	100.0
— Genel Company, Inc.	Oregon	100.0
— General Electric Mortgage Corporation	Oregon	100.0
— Commonwealth Inc.	Oregon	100.0
— Comwe, Inc.	Oregon	100.0
— Genel Insurance Services, Inc.	California	100.0
— Metropolitan REIM	California	100.0

General Electric Real Estate Equities,		
Inc.	Delaware	100.0
Homemakers Finance Service, Inc.	New York	100.0
Homemakers Loan & Consumer		
Discount Company	Pennsylvania	100.0
Puritan Insurance Company	Connecticut	100.0
— Monogram General Insurance		
Agency, Inc.	Delaware	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
Arkansas, Inc.	Arkansas	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
Florida, Inc.	Florida	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
Kentucky	Kentucky	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
Mississippi, Inc.	Mississippi	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
North Carolina, Inc.	North Carolina	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
South Carolina, Inc.	South Carolina	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
Texas, Inc.	Texas	100.0
— Monogram General Agency of		
West Virginia, Inc.	West Virginia	100.0
— Puritan Excess and Surplus Lines		
Insurance Company	Connecticut	100.0
— Puritan Title Insurance Company	Connecticut	100.0
Puritan Life Insurance Company	Rhode Island	100.0
— Monogram Reinsurance		
Corporation	Rhode Island	100.0
Campus Drive Association		
Clinton Employment Center Associates		
Cornell Center Associates		
Dunwoody Place Associates		
Executive Center West Associates		
GEG Associates		
Holiday Pines		
Holiday Pines Service Corp.		
Yacht & Raquet Club of Boca Raton		

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MONTGOMERY MALL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
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GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION,
Respondent.

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.**

Opinions Below.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (A1) is reported at 704 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1983). The memorandum opinion of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (A2) is not officially reported. The order and judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the District of New Mexico, filed October 2, 1980, (A3) is not officially reported. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico (A4) is not officially reported.

Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on April 7, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The jurisdictions of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court were invoked

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471(c) and 1478. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b).

Statutes Involved.

The text of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(a), (c) is set forth in Appendix B1.

Statement of the Case.

The facts of this case are set forth in the two findings and judgments of the Bankruptcy Court, the memorandum opinion of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, and the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The facts as set forth therein, and in the transcripts, are not in all respects consistent with the "statement of the case" and argument contained in the petition for writ of certiorari.

There is no dispute that respondent, General Electric Credit Corporation ("GECC") commenced a foreclosure action against petitioner, Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership ("MMLP") in the New Mexico state courts. An answer was filed admitting the substantive allegations of the complaint, but denying the conclusion that MMLP was in default. A State Court Receiver was appointed in the pending foreclosure action. GECC filed a motion for summary judgment on August 19, 1980, which was set for hearing on September 8, 1980. MMLP filed no response or affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Rather, on September 4, 1980, MMLP commenced a voluntary Chapter 11 case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico. MMLP neither sought nor obtained authorization from the Bankruptcy Court to use the cash collateral of GECC, *i.e.* the rents, issues and profits of the shopping center known as Montgomery Mall. MMLP

supplied no funds to the State Court Receiver, nor to anyone else, for the operation, maintenance or preservation of the shopping center on which GECC held a deed of trust in connection with which the foreclosure action had been commenced.

On September 24, 1980, GECC, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, filed its complaint for relief from the automatic stay, a summons was issued thereon and process was served.

Also, on September 24, 1980, GECC removed the state foreclosure action to the Bankruptcy Court.

On September 24, 1980, GECC filed its motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case as not being filed in good faith, and to prohibit the debtor's use of cash collateral.

On September 26, 1980, the State Court Receiver, still in possession of the shopping mall, received a report of investigation conducted by Design Professionals, Inc., advising the Receiver that the shopping mall was structurally deficient and in danger of imminent collapse and posed a hazard to persons and property in or about the shopping mall. The Receiver forwarded a copy of this report to GECC on about October 1, 1980. On that date, counsel for GECC advised the Court that an emergency existed and requested a hearing for emergency relief. The Bankruptcy Court set aside October 2, 1980, for hearing on the GECC motion for emergency relief from the automatic stay and for summary judgment. On October 1, 1980, both the Court and counsel for GECC gave oral notice to counsel for MMLP that the motion of GECC for emergency relief would be heard the following day, to wit, October 2, 1980. Counsel for GECC worked through the night and, on October 2, 1980, filed with the Bankruptcy Court its motion seeking emergency relief from the automatic stay, for summary judgment of foreclosure, and for an order directing turnover

of cash collateral. Upon the filing of this motion, counsel for MMLP was personally handed a copy thereof. She was present in Court for the emergency hearing and represented MMLP.

As shown by the transcripts, the findings and the opinions below, overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence was produced, showing that an emergency existed, that the shopping mall was a hazard to public safety, and that substantial funds were required to operate, protect and preserve the shopping mall itself. Evidence was introduced, without contradiction, that the principal of the general partner of the debtor had advised the State Court Receiver that neither he nor the general partner would put up any of their own funds to operate or preserve the shopping center, but would rely solely on the cash collateral of GECC. Counsel for MMLP stipulated to the existence and validity of the GECC trust deed, the amount of the indebtedness, and the lack of any equity of the debtor in the shopping mall and the fact of default. Based upon the evidence introduced and the stipulation of counsel for the debtor, the Bankruptcy Court Judge made all of the findings necessary to grant relief from the automatic stay, pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Petitioner, MMLP does not, nor has it ever, challenged the propriety of the order granting relief from the automatic stay allowing GECC to proceed with foreclosure.

Since these same findings necessarily established the propriety of GECC's right to foreclose in the removed foreclosure action, the Bankruptcy Judge proceeded not only to grant relief from the automatic stay, but to enter summary judgment of foreclosure for GECC.

At the hearing, counsel for MMLP protested the shortness of notice and requested additional time, not to contravene any of the allegations of GECC or its right to foreclosure,

but only additional time to see if moneys could be raised to operate, preserve and protect the shopping mall and, thus, justify the Court in not granting relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court, rather than keep the stay in force, granted relief from the stay and summary judgment, but without prejudice to the rights of the debtor, MMLP, "to move to vacate the judgment" on an adequate showing. The Bankruptcy Judge made it clear at the hearing that the only showing he would require was that the debtor was willing and able to supply the necessary funds to operate, repair and preserve the shopping center.

Fourteen days thereafter, MMLP filed its motion to vacate the Bankruptcy Court order of October 2, 1980, and that motion was heard on October 30, 1980. In connection with that motion to vacate, no affidavits or declarations were submitted contravening any of the allegations of GECC in its foreclosure complaint, its complaint for relief from automatic stay, or its motion for emergency relief.

Nevertheless, at the second hearing on October 30, 1980, with MMLP represented by experienced counsel, GECC proceeded *ab initio* and presented once again its entire case justifying not only relief from the automatic stay on an emergency basis, but also, its entitlement to summary judgment under its foreclosure action. The only evidence presented by MMLP at said hearing was testimony that if MMLP could work out a deal with GECC acceptable to the general partner of MMLP, the general partner of MMLP felt it could raise the necessary funds to operate and preserve the shopping center. The debtor admitted that no such agreement with GECC existed and that, in the absence of such agreement, no funds would be forthcoming.

MMLP withdrew none of the stipulations it made at the hearing of October 2, 1980, and it offered no evidence in contradiction to the findings of the Bankruptcy Court after

the October 2, 1980 hearing. The Bankruptcy Judge repeated several times that he was prepared to reimpose the automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, to afford the debtor an opportunity to reorganize, if only the debtor would show some good faith in supplying funds to operate, repair and preserve the shopping center. This, MMLP refused to do. The Bankruptcy Court then refused to vacate its previous judgment and made its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order filed November 3, 1980.

No stay was obtained, foreclosure took place, and the property was sold to GECC.

The debtor, MMLP, took its appeal to the United States District Court, which rendered its memorandum opinion filed and entered March 30, 1981 (A2), upholding both the jurisdiction and the propriety of the Bankruptcy Court to render summary judgment of foreclosure against MMLP. The District Court pointed out that the October 2, 1980 hearing took place some fifty days after the motion for summary judgment had been filed in the State Court, and the debtor, MMLP, failed to controvert any of the allegations in support of GECC's right to summary judgment. The District Judge concluded, "MMLP was in default, the property was not being adequately protected and there was a serious possibility that the premises might be closed."

Thereafter, the debtor, MMLP, filed its appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the summary judgment of the Bankruptcy Court on both jurisdictional and procedural grounds. The debtor then filed with this Court its petition for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING THE WRIT.

1. No allegation is made that the decision below of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is in conflict with the decision of any other Federal Court of Appeals on the same matter.
2. No allegation is made that the Federal Court of Appeals below has decided an important question of federal law which has not but should be settled by the Supreme Court, or has decided a federal question in a way that is in conflict with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. The jurisdictional issue was settled when this Court decided that its decision in *Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.*, (9th Cir. 1982) ____U.S.____, 102 S.Ct. 2858 would apply prospectively only. (Page 2880). The interpretation has been that the *Northern Pipeline* decision does not have effect on Bankruptcy Court decisions pending on appeal before June 28, 1982, the date of the Supreme Court opinion. *Barnes v. Wheland*, 698 F.2d 193, 196 N.1 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
3. Petitioner has no substantive interest in the subject matter of the litigation. It was stipulated to below and found that the debtor has no equity in the shopping mall which is the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, the result of granting a writ of certiorari, and reversing the decisions below would be that GECC would have to proceed a third time to a hearing on its motion for summary judgment in the foreclosure action on evidence that has already been stipulated to by the petitioner, MMLP. Thus, GECC would be forced to duplicate, without possible benefit to petitioner, its foreclosure on the property.
4. The issues on appeal are moot. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) provides that any reversal or modification on appeal re sale of property authorized by § 363 of the Bankruptcy Court

will not effect the validity of such sale to an entity that purchased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale were stayed pending appeal.

To the same effect, see also Rule 805 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

The Courts of Appeals have consistently held that an appeal from an order of the Bankruptcy Court authorizing a sale of property will be dismissed as moot where no stay has been obtained prior to the sale. See *In re Rock Industries Machinery Corp.*, 572 F.2d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1978); *Abingdon Realty Corp.*, 530 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1976); *In the Matter of National Home Owners Sales Corp.*, 554 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.); *Greylock Glen Corp. v. Community Savings Bank*, 656 F.2d 1 (CA 1st Cir. 1981).

5. There was no violation of FRCP 56. The petitioner had more than fifty days prior to the October 2, 1980 hearing to contravert the summary motion allegations of GECC, and more than seventy-five days to contravert the allegations prior to the hearing on October 30, 1980.

Conclusion.

Counsel for respondent has received no notice that counsel for petitioner before this Court was substituted as counsel for the petitioner, or that any such substitution was authorized by the Bankruptcy Court to allow Mr. Goren to act as the fourth counsel of record of MMLP in the case. Regardless of whether counsel appearing for petitioner herein is authorized to act for the petitioner, it is clear from the record below that there has been no deprivation of an opportunity to reorganize by the debtor. Rather, it is clear that the debtor has utilized the bankruptcy laws to avoid and delay foreclosure upon its property, without being willing to invest any of its own funds. It must appear from the

record that petitioner MMLP, has achieved nothing from its appeals except delay and inordinate expense to respondent.

This petition is frivolous. The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied and appropriate damages should be awarded to respondent against the general partner of MMLP and such other parties as are responsible for such frivolous use of the certiorari process.

Respectfully submitted,

SULMEYER, KUPETZ, BAUMANN & ROTHMAN,
A Professional Corporation,

and

SUTIN, THAYER & BROWNE,
A Professional Corporation,
By IRVING SULMEYER,
Attorneys for Respondent.

APPENDIX A1.

The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, A Texas Limited Partnership, Debtor, General Electric Credit Corporation, a New York Corporation, Appellee, v. Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, a Texas Limited Partnership, Appellant.

Date: April 7, 1983, 704 F. 2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1983), No. 81-1525.

Before DOYLE, Circuit Judge, BREITENSTEIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

The appellant, the Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, appeals from a federal bankruptcy court order which granted foreclosure by way of summary judgment, in favor of appellee, General Electric Credit Corporation. That order was affirmed by the federal district court.

Montgomery Mall is a limited partnership and is the owner of the Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center located in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. The debt by Montgomery Mall to General Electric's predecessor in interest, General Electric Credit Corporation of Colorado, is secured by mortgages on the Center and by an assignment of leases and rents from the Center's operations.

Montgomery Mall (MMLP) failed to make payments due under its obligations. General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) instituted a foreclosure action in the state court. That action was commenced on June 16, 1980 and sought (1) foreclosure of the mortgage on Montgomery Center; and (2) foreclosure of GECC's security agreement with MMLP covering rents and profits. The third element of relief which was prayed for was the appointment of a receiver for Montgomery Center.

MMLP filed an answer to the action on July 15, 1980. In it, MMLP admitted its liability to GECC in excess of \$8,000,000, and admitted that it had failed to make a payment when due and after notice by GECC. It denied, however, that it was in default.

GECC moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was set to be heard on September 8, 1980. On September 4, 1980, MMLP filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which had the effect of staying the action, including the pending summary judgment hearing.

GECC proceeded to file, on September 24, 1980, several documents, including (1) a motion to dismiss MMLP's Chapter 11 proceeding; (2) an application for removal of GECC's pending state action; and (3) a complaint to modify the automatic stay of the state foreclosure proceedings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). A copy of this complaint was mailed to MMLP on September 24, 1980.

On October 1, 1980, GECC informed Bankruptcy Court Judge Johnson that it wished to move for emergency relief from the stay of foreclosure proceedings to §362(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Judge indicated that he informed MMLP's counsel of this motion on October 1.

On October 2, 1980, GECC's motion for emergency relief and summary judgment was filed. The grounds for emergency relief were two-fold. First, the claim of GECC that MMLP had failed to provide funds for the payment of operating expenses, and for the salaries of maintenance, security, and management personnel. Second, GECC claimed that MMLP had failed to make funds available for structural repairs which, if not undertaken, would warrant shut-down of the Center.

The hearing on the motion was heard on the same day it was filed, October 2, and Judge Johnson found that MMLP

did not intend to meet payroll and operating expenses which were then due, that immediate structural repairs were required to preserve the safety of the tenants and customers of the Center, and that irreparable harm to GECC would thereby ensue. Judge Johnson also terminated the stay to the extent necessary for GECC to foreclose its mortgages and security interests. Also, judgment against MMLP, in the sum of \$8,054,165.33 plus accrued interest, was entered.

Judge Johnson's judgment, however, was without prejudice to the rights of the debtor within ten days from the date thereof to move to vacate the judgment upon an adequate hearing.

On October 14, 1980, MMLP filed a motion to vacate the order and judgment. That motion was heard on October 30. On that occasion, MMLP presented little evidence as to why the earlier grant of summary judgment should not be vacated. Instead, counsel for MMLP argued that the grant of summary judgment was procedurally defective. GECC opposed MMLP's approach at the October 30 hearing by presenting evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment.

On November 3, 1980, Judge Johnson reaffirmed his decision to grant summary judgment to GECC and against MMLP.

The propriety of these proceedings is what is being challenged here now.

The assertion of MMLP is that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction under §362(2) to grant summary relief in favor of GECC.

This is a position that might have had some validity prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-598. *See In re Roloff*, 598 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 1979). Also, considering the Supreme Court's recent decision in Northern

Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982), MMLP's assertion might have some merit. *Northern Pipeline* held unconstitutional the assignment of broad jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges. 102 S.Ct. at 2874. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1980) However, the Supreme Court, in *Northern Pipeline*, was careful to say that the decision was not to be applied retroactively. See *Northern Pipeline*, *supra*, at 2880. The interpretation has been that the *Northern Pipeline* decision does not have affect on bankruptcy court decisions pending on appeal before June 28, 1982, the date of the Supreme Court opinion. Barnes v. Wheland, 689 F.2d 193, 196 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

In examining the authority or jurisdiction of the Judge to grant summary relief in favor of GECC prior to the *Northern Pipeline* decision, it would appear that such authority did exist. See 124 Cong. Rec. 534,010 (Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Senator DeConcini). The Bankruptcy Reform Act "grants the courts of appeals original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11. That jurisdiction in turn is completely delegated to the bankruptcy court with the sole exception of punishing for contempts by imprisonment and enjoining other courts. The bankruptcy court is thus given pervasive jurisdiction over all proceedings arising in or related to bankruptcy cases. In addition, the bankruptcy court is given exclusive jurisdiction of the property of the estate in a case under Title 11. This represents a major improvement over present law where the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction often results in wasteful litigation."

The Rule 56 Problem

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a motion for summary judgment "shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). MMLP asserts that, since it received no more than a one day notice of the October 2 hearing conducted by Judge Johnson, the requirements of Rule 56 were not met.

Apparently a hearing conducted without proper notice will be set aside. *See Swallow v. United States*, 380 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1967) (one day notice of hearing to set aside default judgment is inadequate).

But there are differences between these proceedings and an ordinary case. The first of these is that MMLP was on notice that GECC sought summary judgment in the stayed state proceedings. Indeed, "GEC's State Court motion for summary judgment was begun on August 19th and set for hearing on September 8, a full 20 days." Surely, therefore, MMLP should have been aware that GECC was likely to pursue summary judgment relief in bankruptcy court. At the very least, MMLP should have prepared affidavits in opposition to GECC's state court motion for summary judgment, affidavits which could have been used in opposition to GECC's bankruptcy court motion.

The foregoing indicates that MMLP cannot be heard to complain that it was prejudiced by short notice of the October 2 bankruptcy court hearing. *Cf. Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc.*, 639 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.), *cert denied*, 454 U.S. 838 (1981) ("where no potential disputed material fact exists, a summary judgment will not be disturbed even though the district court disregarded the procedure which should have been followed"); *Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc.*, 611 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979) ("it is not reversible error for a district court to grant summary judgment before expiration of the ten day period if the non-moving party can demonstrate no prejudice").

Moreover, Judge Johnson's order was subject to a motion to vacate on the part of MMLP. Such a motion was, indeed, made, and a full hearing was had on the motion on October 30, some 29 days after GECC moved for summary judgment in bankruptcy court, and some 72 days after GECC first moved for summary judgment in state court. Nevertheless, MMLP presented very little evidence at the October 30 hearing in support of its motion to vacate, arguing primarily that the October 2 hearing violated the 10 day notice requirement of Rule 56(c).

Section 1479(c) of Title 28 suggests a third reason why, in proceedings such as these, it was not inappropriate for Judge Johnson to grant summary judgment. The section provides:

All injunctions, orders or other proceedings, in an action prior to removal of such action under section 1478 of this title shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the bankruptcy court.

28 U.S.C. 1479(c)(Supp. IV 1980).

Section 1479(c) is virtually identical to Section 1450 of Title 28. It has been held under Section 1450 that motions pending in state court survive removal to federal court, and may be passed upon by the federal court. *Bramwell v. Owen*, 276 F. 36, 39 (D. Oregon 1921); 1A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶0.168 (45) & n. 12 (1974) (interpreting Section 1450); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 3.01(b) & n. 120 (1980) (interpreting Section 1479(c)).

Sections 1450 and 1479 give at least implicit recognition that notice had in state court proceedings is sufficient to serve as notice of the pendency of proceedings, orders, and motions removed to federal court. Cf. *Bryce v. Southern Ry.*, 129 F. #966, 967 (Cir. Ct. D.S.C. 1904) (removal does "not extend time for answering the complaint"); *in re Chamberlain*, 125 F. 631, 632 (Cir. Ct. D. Conn. 1903)

(notice of defense and notice of intent to suffer default filed in state court does not have to be filed again upon removal to federal court; these notices filed in state court serve as evidence of defendant's intended action in federal court).

Our conclusion is that MMLP ought not to be heard to complain of inadequate notice of GECC's intent to move for summary judgment. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that MMLP's Chapter 11 proceeding and GECC's removed state proceeding had different cause numbers. They clearly concerned one and the same item of business, the Montgomery Shopping Center.

There is one other matter to be mentioned and that is § 362(f) of Title 11, which provides:

The (bankruptcy) court, without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a hearing * * *.

11 U.S.C. § 362(f)(1976).

In making its bankruptcy court motion for summary judgment, GECC asserted that irreparable injury would ensue unless expenses of the Montgomery Shopping Center were met and unless structural repairs were undertaken. Indeed, the City of Albuquerque's mechanical and structural engineer testified that the shopping center presented a public hazard, and that he would recommend that it be closed.

Accordingly, it was not inappropriate for Judge Johnson to grant relief in accordance with § 362(f) with provision for a rehearing upon a motion to vacate.

In light of the foregoing, the grant of summary judgment by Judge Johnson is affirmed. Also we deem it unnecessary to consider GECC's motion to dismiss this appeal for moot-

ness under Rule 805 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
This court has, in any event, twice denied the same motion.

APPENDIX A2.

Memorandum Opinion.

In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.

General Electric Credit Corporation, a New York corporation, Plaintiff, v. Montgomery Mall Limited, Partnership, a Texas limited partnership, Defendant. No. 81-866-M Civil.

Entered on Docket No. 30 1981.

The record shows, and it appears uncontroverted, that the General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) filed an action of foreclosure against Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership (MMLP) in the District Court for Bernalillo County on June 16, 1980.

GECC moved for summary judgment in the State Court on August 19, 1980, which was set for hearing on September 8, 1980. September 4, 1980, GECC applied to remove its foreclosure action to Bankruptcy Court.

October 1, 1980, MMLP's counsel moved to withdraw for failure to arrive at a fee arrangement and inability to get her client to review material and make decisions of course of litigation and handling debenture funds. New counsel entered an appearance October 3, 1980.

October 2, 1980, GECC filed its motion in Bankruptcy Court to grant immediate relief from the automatic stay and for summary judgment under the removed proceedings.

The same date, the Bankruptcy Court, with counsel for both parties present, terminated the stay as to GECC, awarded judgment against MMLP under the foreclosure action, foreclosed the liens, ordered the property sold and allowed a one-month period of redemption. MMLP was allowed ten days from the entry of the order and the judgment to move

to vacate the judgment.

October 14, 1980, MMLP moved to vacate the judgment stating as grounds:

Lack of jurisdiction and inadequate notice.

Inaccurate allegation.

Offer to present a plan of arrangement.

On October 15, 1980, defendant was notified that the motion to vacate the judgment would be heard on November 3, 1980, later changed to October 30, 1980 at MMLP's request. At this hearing MMLP still made no effort to offer any proof on the summary judgment question.

Notice of Appeal to District Court was filed by MMLP on October 31, 1980, from the Bankruptcy Court's order of October 2, 1980.

November 3, 1980, the findings, conclusions and order of the Bankruptcy Court were entered pursuant to the hearing on October 30, 1980, denying the motion to vacate the ruling of October 2, 1980.

November 3, 1980, MMLP filed its motion to stay the Court's order which was denied December 4, 1980, *sua sponte*.

November 12, 1980 MMLP filed its motion to stay ratification of the foreclosure sale.

November 12, 1980 MMLP filed its notice of appeal of the November 3, 1980 ruling to the District Court.

November 13, 1980 MMLP filed its amended motion to stay ratification of foreclosure sale, which was denied on December 5, 1980.

November 24, 1980, MMLP's successor counsel moved to withdraw because his client refused to follow advice and to make files available and had made no satisfactory fee arrangement. January 22, 1981, second successor counsel

entered appearance.

The brief in chief of MMLP states the three questions on appeal:

1. Did Bankruptcy Court fail to give notice to grant summary judgment.
2. Did Bankruptcy Court fail to give notice of the summary judgment hearing or deprive MMLP of the opportunity to respond.
3. Was the summary judgment clearly erroneous.

MMLP appears to agree that summary judgment is the kind of proceeding which a Bankruptcy Court now has jurisdiction to hear but that it lacked jurisdiction for failure of timely or adequate notice under F.R.Civ.P. 56, which provides for service of the motion for summary judgment at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing.

In looking at the chronology of the foreclosure proceeding, it appears that GECC's State Court motion for summary judgment was begun on August 19th and set for hearing on September 8, a full 20 days. The bankruptcy filing on September 4, came 16 days after the motion for summary judgment. Ample time existed to controvert the issues on summary judgment in State Court. At least there was time to prepare a petition in bankruptcy. On September 24, GECC's foreclosure action was removed to Bankruptcy Court, some 36 days after the summary judgment motion was filed. October 2, GECC moved for a summary judgment of which MMLP's counsel had knowledge and made an appearance, although a motion to withdraw had been filed on October 1. This was some 50 days after the motion for summary judgment was filed and during which time no step was taken to controvert or oppose the motion for summary judgment nor to resolve the issue.

There is not an element of surprise here as MMLP was well aware of the pendency of the motion for summary

judgment and that it had been set to be heard. Before this could happen MMLP filed bankruptcy thus staying any action on the motion for summary judgment in State Court.

The removal of the foreclosure to Bankruptcy Court was ample to put MMLP on notice that again the summary judgment motion would be a factor to contend with.

MMLP had ample time to controvert the judgment granting summary judgment and still took no step to controvert GECC's proof nor to otherwise resolve the problem.

MMLP still has not taken a step to bring the procedure to a halt by supersedeas or otherwise so as to stop the mechanism of foreclosure and sale or to protect GECC.

There was ample proof to justify the Bankruptcy Court's removal of the stay order of foreclosure and to proceed with the foreclosure sale. MMLP was in default, the property was not being adequately protected and there was a serious possibility that the premises might be closed.

The Bankruptcy Court's Order is hereby AFFIRMED.

/s/ (illegible)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

APPENDIX A3.

Order and Judgment.

In re Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, a Texas limited partnership, Debtor, General Electric Credit Corporation, a New York Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, a Texas Limited Partnership, Defendant.

In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico.

October 2, 1980.

Chapter 11, No. 80-00938J. Adversary Proceeding, No. 80-0419J.

This cause came on before the Court on the plaintiff General Electric Credit Corporation's ("GECC") Motion for Order Granting Immediate Relief from Stay and Granting Summary Judgment. GECC was represented by Irving Sulmeyer and Jonathan B. Sutin. The debtor, Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership ("MMLP"), was represented by Jennie Deden Behles. The Court has considered the documents on file in this action, including the state court foreclosure action, the testimony presented to the Court in support of the motion, and the argument of counsel. The Court is fully informed and advised regarding all of the issues raised by the motion.

THE COURT FINDS:

1. The debtor has not met and does not intend to meet the payroll and operating expenses presently due and owing at the Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center and it appears that approximately \$4,000 in payroll expenses that are due to administrative, maintenance, and security employees on October 2, 1980 will not be met. Nonpayment of this payroll will likely cause these employees to stop work. A work

stoppage will likely cause disruption of the running of the shopping center and may likely precipitate its closing.

2. Immediate significant structural repairs are required in order to preserve the safety of the tenants and customers of the Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center. MMLP has not made any funds available for the structural repairs nor has the debtor undertaken to make such repairs. MMLP has not indicated any intent to embark on or provide money for these repairs.

3. MMLP's current indebtedness to General Electric Credit Corporation is \$7,762,564.21 plus accrued interest through August 31, 1980 of \$278,805.43, plus accrued interest for September, 1980 of \$71,156.77, plus accrued late charges of \$12,795.69, plus attorney fees and costs and expenses of litigation and collection. The value of the assets of MMLP, is currently not more than \$7,000,000.

4. GECC has not been offered, nor has GECC received adequate protection for its interest in Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center.

5. MMLP has not sought or offered adequate protection to GECC for the use of cash collateral pursuant to section 363(c) and MMLP has no authority to use said cash collateral. It appears that if the cash collateral held by the receiver, Leon Management Corporation is turned over to MMLP, MMLP may use GECC's cash collateral to pay current operating expenses in violation of GECC's directions and in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 363(c).

6. The indebtedness to GECC is secured by a valid mortgage upon the real property of MMLP and a valid security interest in the personal property of MMLP and a valid assignment of all leases and rents of its shopping center known as Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center.

7. MMLP has no equity in its real or personal property or the rents derived therefrom. MMLP is not a position to propose an effective or meaningful reorganization.

THE COURT CONCLUDES:

1. The court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and issues raised by the motion.

2. Without the immediate payment of current operating expenses, including current payroll due October 2, 1980, GECC and Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center will suffer permanent irreparable damage due to loss of customers, tenants, and harm to business reputation.

3. Without the immediate structural repairs necessary to preserve the structural stability and safety of the shopping center and its tenants and customers, permanent and irreparable damage will result to GECC and Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center due to the loss of tenants and customers and harm to business reputation, and possible liabilities for injuries suffered by tenants or customers and injuries to property may occur as a result of structural defects.

4. MMLP has no equity in its real and personal property or the rents derived therefrom. MMLP has no ability to propose or consummate a meaningful or effective reorganization.

5. MMLP has not offered nor given GECC any adequate protection for its interest in Montgomery Plaza Shopping Center.

6. Immediate relief from the automatic stay by a vacation and termination of the automatic stay and a judgment of foreclosure are necessary to prevent irreparable damage to GECC.

7. MMLP should be required to turn over to GECC all rents and income from the shopping center that it has in its possession, custody or control.

THE COURT ORDERS that GECC's Motion for Order Granting Immediate Relief from Stay and Granting Summary Judgment is granted.

THE COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:

1. The automatic stay is modified, vacated and terminated to the extent appropriate and necessary to permit GECC to foreclose its mortgages and security interests on the real and personal property of MMLP and the estate ("the property").
2. MMLP is required to turn over to GECC all rent and income from the property in MMLP's possession, custody or control.
3. Richard J. Leon, receiver, is restored to possession of the property on behalf of GECC subject to the liens and security interests of GECC.
4. The rents from the property may be used by the receiver for the maintenance, repair, upkeep and safety and security of the property. The funds used are deemed mandatory advances by GECC under the promissory notes, mortgages, security agreements and loan agreements.
5. GECC is hereby awarded judgment against MMLP in the sum of \$8,054,165.33 plus accrued interest, representing the indebtedness of MMLP to GECC on the promissory notes and obligations alleged in GECC's foreclosure complaint.
6. GECC is hereby further awarded judgment against MMLP for all costs and expenses of collection, foreclosure and litigation, including costs and attorney fees, incurred by GECC, and is further awarded an additional amount for expenses of foreclosure sale, including costs and a reasonable attorney fee, incurred by GECC in an amount which the Court may by further order direct.

7. The liens of GECC's mortgages and security agreements alleged in GECC's foreclosure complaint are hereby foreclosed against MMLP in the total sum of \$8,054,165.33 plus accrued interest and costs and expenses of collection, foreclosure and litigation, and the liens of the mortgages and security interests are hereby declared first and paramount liens against the property described in the mortgages and security agreements (and, more particularly with respect to the real property, against the real property described on Exhibit A attached hereto).

8. MMLP is barred and foreclosed from any and all right, title, interest and equity of redemption in and to the property after the expiration of one month following the sale of the property as hereinafter ordered by the Court.

9. GECC may proceed to have all of the property covered by GECC's mortgages and security agreements and interests sold at public auction in the manner prescribed by law. Richard J. Leon is hereby appointed Special Master by this Court and he shall conduct the sale. The sale shall be for cash payable immediately. GECC may be a purchaser at the sale and may use this judgment or a portion of this judgment as a credit on its bid.

10. The Special Master shall submit a report of sale and Special Master's Deed to the Court for approval, and upon such approval, shall be released and discharged. The Special Master shall receive compensation for his services at the rate of \$75.00 per hour.

11. The proceeds of the foreclosure sale shall be applied in the following order:

a. to the expenses of conducting the sale, including the Special Master's compensation, costs of publication, and to GECC's attorney fees in this regard;

b. to the costs of this action;

c. to the payment of this judgment together with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per year from the date of entry of this judgment until the date of payment; and

d. to any junior lienholder named as a defendant herein according to the priority of any such claimant or claimants and in the amount of any judgment obtained by such junior lienholder.

12. The purchaser at foreclosure sale will take title to the property free and clear of any and all claims of all parties in this action, subject, however, to the following:

a. to a one-month statutory right of redemption; and
b. to any patent reservations, easements, restrictions of record, and assessments.

3. This Judgment is without prejudice to the rights of the debtor within 10 days from the date hereof to move to vacate the judgment you on adequate showing.

/s/ Robert Johnson

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

[Exhibit (legal discription omitted)]

APPENDIX A4.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

In re: Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, a Texas Limited Partnership, Debtor, General Electric Credit Corporation, a New York corporation, Plaintiff v. Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, a Texas Limited Partnership, Defendant.

Chapter 11 No. 80-00938J.

Adversary Proceeding No. 80-0419.

Appearances: Irving Sulmeyer and Jonathan Sutin for General Electric Credit Corporation; Alfred Carvajal and Jerry Dickinson for Montgomery Mall Limited Partnership, Debtor.

The defendant's Motion to Vacate the Court's Order and Judgment of October 2, 1980 came on to be heard at 9:30 a.m. on October 30, 1980, in the Bankruptcy Courtroom in the Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Defendant argued that this Court was without jurisdiction on October 2, 1980, to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. This argument was predicated upon two grounds. The first ground is that Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires ten days notice of a hearing on summary judgment, and that such notice was not afforded to defendant in that October 2 hearing. The second ground was that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 11 U.S.C. 362(f) to go beyond the issues raised in a complaint for relief from the automatic stay.

The first argument is apparently premised upon the assumption that the hearing on October 2, 1980, was an *ex*

parte hearing under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(f). However, such was not the case. Although a very short notice was given of the hearing, oral notice that the hearing would be held on October 2 was conveyed to counsel for the debtor both by the Court and by counsel for GECC on October 1, 1980. Present counsel for the debtor, having erroneously assumed the hearing was *ex parte*, analogized a 362(f) hearing to a hearing under Section 362(d). Undoubtedly such an analogy is appropriate.

However, counsel's conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issues in the foreclosure case is totally without merit. The cases cited by counsel to support the contention are all cases involving suits commenced prior to October 1, 1979, and hence have no applicability to a case, such as this one, commenced after October 1, 1979. In the cases cited, no summary jurisdiction existed in the Bankruptcy Court as it was then constituted. Accordingly, those cases are appropriate for the proposition that the formerly limited jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court was not properly invoked in some circumstances. They have no application to a complaint for relief from stay in a Code case. The pernicious distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction has now been accorded the decent burial it so richly deserved. The Bankruptcy Court as now constituted has ample jurisdiction to decide issues in a foreclosure case. As an illustration of that point, the foreclosure action pending in this Court was removed from the District Court of Bernalillo County.

A second erroneous assumption, again entirely unsupported by fact, is made by debtor in connection with the spurious asserted jurisdictional limitation. Although nor-

mally it is inappropriate to consider matters other than a complaint for relief from the automatic stay at a hearing on such a complaint, that reticence springs from the statutory mandate and consequent necessity to hear such complaints within thirty days of the day they are filed. It is simply not possible to hear such complaints, coupled with all other matters that might be present in those cases, within that thirty-day period. This reluctance to hear is not an institutional inability to take up and decide the matters in a jurisdictional sense, but is based solely on limitations imposed by time and space. This reluctance is attempted in this case to be translated into a lack of jurisdiction.

This bankruptcy petition was filed after the institution of a foreclosure petition in the state district court. After the appointment of a receiver in that case by Judge Cole, plaintiff GECC served and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the state court. On the day of the hearing in the state court on that summary judgment motion, debtor filed its petition herein, thus invoking the automatic stay and divesting the state court of the power to go forward and hear the issues in that case. It is this foreclosure action which was then removed from the state court.

The debtor was properly served with a summary judgment motion in the state court in August of 1980 when that motion was filed. Debtor had ample opportunity to file a contradicting affidavit in the state court, and, after the action was removed to this Court, had ample time in this Court, but chose not to do so.

After this Court disposed of all the issues in the automatic stay phase of the hearing on October 2, the Court proceeded to the Motion for Summary Judgment, in accordance with the oral notice given to counsel for the debtor by counsel for GECC. The second point raised in the Motion of the debtor is that there was inadequate notice given for that

hearing on the summary judgment issue. That argument misconceives both the facts of this case and the application of Rule 56.

Debtor asserts that it was not given any opportunity to present opposing affidavits. It is a familiar principle that when a case is removed from a state court to a federal court, the federal court sits as if it were the state trial court. In the removed case, debtor had almost fifty days to present opposing affidavits and chose not to do so. Debtor's argument further misconceives the ten-day notice provision under Rule 56. That rule requires that the summary judgment motion be served at least ten days before the day fixed for the hearing upon that Motion. As stated, the summary judgment motion in this case was filed in August in the removed proceedings. Rule 56 does not require that ten days notice of the *hearing* on the summary judgment be given, but only that the *service* of the motion be ten days prior to the hearing. There was full compliance with that rule in this case.

In addition, Rule 6(d) permits the time within which motions may be heard to be shortened. Although a very short notice for the hearing on summary judgment on October 2 was given, notice in fact was given. That notice was pursuant to a telephone call from counsel for GECC, Mr. Charles Price, a young lawyer in whom the Court has great confidence. Mr. Price reported only that an emergency existed in the view of GECC, and asked for an emergency hearing. The Court was about to take up another matter in the Courtroom and asked Mr. Price to give notice to counsel for the debtor. It was acknowledged that such notice was given. Thus we are dealing here with a situation in which notice, concededly very short, was given, and not a case where there was a lack of notice.

Therefore, cases such as *Franklin v. Oklahoma City Abstract and Title Company*, 584 F.2d 964 (1978) are not in

point. That case involved a 12(b)(6) Motion, which the trial court treated as a motion for summary judgment without notice to the plaintiff of its intention to do so. In the case at bar, the Motion filed was one for summary judgment, and thus there was no necessity for again informing debtor of that fact. This is particularly true since the reason for the Franklin rule is to provide a "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent" to the summary judgment motion. As stated, more than adequate opportunity has been afforded to debtor herein.

In addition, a further point of considerable importance should be made with respect to the opportunity to be heard. Some twenty-eight days passed between the entry of the Court's judgment on October 2 and the hearing on the Motion to Vacate on October 30. Yet within that twenty-eight day period, debtor made no attempt to file any motion or affidavit which contained any factual recitation sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material facts so as to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Surely if such facts were available, debtor had adequate opportunity within that time to bring them forward. Indeed the Court's oral order from the bench on October 2 was to the effect that if the debtor came forward to do the necessary repairs it would be restored to the possession upon an adequate showing of its ability to make those repairs. No such showing was attempted to be made in this case. Accordingly, the Motion, based as it is only upon the asserted lack of jurisdiction should be, and the same hereby is, denied.

In order to insure that all the matters which debtor might wish to present on the merits were presented and considered, and that the debtor was not deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present its case, the Court invited evidence even after ruling it would not, on jurisdictional grounds, vacate its previous Judgment of October 2. Evidence on the

issue of adequate protection adduced at the October 30 hearing confirmed that the debt to GECC approximates \$8,000,000.00 and that the value of the collateral is between \$6,000,000.00, and \$7,000,000.00. Thus the debtor has no equity in the project. Indeed, Goldner, the president of the corporate general partner of the debtor, testified that in his view the property had a value of no more than four and a half million dollars, based upon the rental situation.

From the evidence that was presented, the Court has no alternative but to find that serious structural discrepancies and deficiencies exist at the Montgomery Mall, and that these deficiencies present an immediate hazard to public safety. Debtor has no intention of performing its duty to make these premises safe for the public and for the merchants who lease from it.

Officials of the City of Albuquerque testified that if no repairs were undertaken, they would be forced to undertake legal action under an emergency basis to shut down the Mall until repairs were undertaken. Although debtor made much of the fact that the City had not as yet instituted those proceedings, the reason for any delay was that GECC had commenced the repairs. After the Court order of Thursday, October 2, GECC retained a contractor and commenced the repairs on Friday, October 3, and informed the City of the engineer's report and the corrective action on Monday, October 6.

Moreover, the lack of equity in the project makes clear the reasons for the debtor's cavalier attitude towards its obligation. The unfavorable publicity necessarily attendant upon the institution of the emergency legal action seeking to force the closing of the Mall for the reason that the structure was in danger of collapse, thus exposing the shoppers to hazard, would not wound the debtor, who could walk away without further loss. But such publicity would

undoubtedly feel aggrieved at such a turn of events, and ultimately reduce the market value of the Mall still further. Thus there would appear to be no adequate protection for the interest of GECC, apart from the fact that it is already in a deficit position.

Had debtor evidenced both the desire and the ability to make the immediate repairs necessary to make the premises safe, the Court would have vacated its prior order and permitted the debtor to again operate the premises. But the debtor recognizes that its ability to propose a meaningful reorganization depends on reaching some sort of accommodation with GECC, and debtor is not sufficiently certain of its ability to make that agreement to persuade it to make the emergency repairs. Those repairs are estimated at a cost of \$215,000.00 on an emergency basis, and to reach \$700,000.00 in order to make the permanent repairs necessary to correct the deficiencies.

Having elected to eschew its obligation to make the premises safe, debtor chose to hope that perhaps no force would occur to destroy the structure or have it deteriorate further. Such a hope is not an adequate basis for refusal to make the repairs or to protect the public.

Other instances of what can best be described as debtor's indifference to its obligations is the debtor's attitude toward the cash collateral. Debtor's position, announced quite forthrightly, was simply that it would ignore the statutory prohibition contained in 11 U.S.C. 363(c)(2) against the use of such collateral by a debtor, absent consent by an affected creditor or approval by the Court.

It is this Court's view that it is imperative that the repairs be made to the structure immediately or that the premises be closed to the public until such time as the repairs are made. If the premises are closed to the public, it is the

Court's feeling that there would be no hope of a successful reorganization. Accordingly, the only practical course is to make the repairs and keep the Mall open.

The debtor has announced that it will not make the necessary repairs unless it can make an agreement with General Electric Credit Corporation, which agreement has not been forthcoming. Accordingly, it seems to the Court that the Summary Judgment in favor of GECC should be confirmed.

The Court has treated the Motion to vacate the sale, currently scheduled for November 5, as an adjunct to the Motion to Vacate the Order of October 2. Since it is the Court's view that the Order of October 2 should not be vacated, the Court is likewise of the view that the sale previously noticed for November 5, 1980, should not be postponed.

DONE at Albuquerque, New Mexico on this 3rd day of November, 1980.

/s/ (illegible)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

APPENDIX B.1.

Rule 56. Summary Judgment.

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

* * * *

(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is not genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

Service of the within and receipt of a copy thereof is
hereby admitted this day
of July, A.D. 1983
